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 Abstract 
 
The main theories of European economic integration argue that private economic 
interests play an important role in the integration process. This role is a positive one, 
whereby economic interests provide the impetus and pressures for integration to move 
forward. Public policy analyses of the European Union’s legislative process, however, 
show that intense lobbying by such interests can prevent legislative proposals from being 
adopted, even if these economic interests were initially in favour of supranational 
legislation in the given policy area. So how is it possible that economic interests may 
initially be favourable to integration in a given policy area but then end up rejecting 
legislative proposals made by the Commission, usually by intensely lobbying the 
European Parliament and/or the Council of Ministers? The answer is based on the idea 
that economic interests initially face great uncertainty as to the precise costs and benefits 
of integrating a particular policy area. Only once the ‘fog of integration’ lifts – as a result 
of concrete legislative proposals being tabled by the Commission – are economic 
interests able to calculate these costs and benefits and, consequently, decide whether to 
lobby for or against the proposal. To provide a first run at validating the argument, the 
paper examines two cases of integration failure in the EU: the directive on patenting 
computer-implemented inventions (‘Software Patent Directive’) and the directive on 
takeover bids (‘Takeover Directive’). These cases not only indicate that the argument is 
valid but they also suggest that integration failure can take different forms depending on 
how economic interest polarize on a given policy issue. This leads us to conclude that 
regional integration scholars would benefit from integrating the lessons learned from the 
studies of EU politics and policy-making into their models of European integration. 
 
KEYWORDS: economic interests; European integration; standards harmonisation; 
software patent directive; takeover directive; uncertainty.   
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INTRODUCTION 
There appears to be a common belief amongst scholars of European economic integration 
that the latter proceeds as a result of private economic interests asking for the 
harmonisation of laws, regulations and standards in order to reduce the transaction costs 
associated with the movement of goods, services, capital and people across borders. 
When integration does not proceed forward, it is because member state governments 
prevent it from doing so, often as a result of domestic private economic interests 
preferring to maintain existing obstacles to cross-border economic exchanges. The reality 
is, however, different. There are many instances where private economic interests were 
initially in favour of integration but where the attempt to create supranational legislation 
that would harmonise rules and standards across the EU ended up failing as a result of 
fierce lobbying by economic interests. It should be noted that integration failure takes 
place when the status quo remains. As such, it can take two forms: a direct and an 
indirect one. Direct integration failure occurs with the elimination of the proposed 
legislation.
1 Indirect integration failure takes place when the adopted legislation contains 
so many loopholes, opt-outs or acceptable standards that it formally recognises the status 
quo. 
An example of the first case of integration failure is that of the Software Patent 
Directive. On 6 July 2005, the European Parliament (EP) rejected the Commission’s 
proposed directive on the patentability of computer-implemented inventions (‘Software 
Patent Directive’)
2 by an overwhelming majority. This vote effectively put an end to the 
proposed legislation. An example of the second case of integration failure is the Takeover 
                                                 
1 Either it is withdrawn by the Commission or it rejected by the EP or the Council. 
2 See Commission of the European Communities (2002a). 
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Directive. On 16 December 2003, the EP adopted the Commission’s proposed directive 
on takeover bids (‘Takeover Directive’)
3 but with a number of key amendments. The 
Council of Ministers finally approved the Takeover Directive along with the EP’s 
amendments on 21 April 2004. The problem with this agreement, which was 
implemented into national law in May 2006, is that it contains many opt outs that greatly 
reduce its usefulness in fostering European economic integration. As such, it is generally 
considered a failure. 
  What do these examples of legislative failures mean for European integration and 
the theories that explain it? How can they be possible when, after all, business interests 
were originally supportive of the intent to harmonize standards and regulations in these 
fields as a way to promote further European economic integration? Such questions find 
no answers in existing theoretical approaches to regional integration. One reason for this 
situation may be because these approaches always assume that economic interests know 
clearly the benefits and costs of integration beforehand. But what happens if in fact they 
do not? How does it affect our understanding of European integration, both practically 
and theoretically? These are the questions that this paper seeks to answer. 
  It does so by examining the apparent paradoxical relationship between economic 
(especially business) interests and European integration, whereby supranational 
legislation in a given policy area can fail even though there is originally support from 
economic interests for integrating this policy area. If the EP and Council are responsive 
to the opinions of economic interests, this means that over time certain groups decide to 
oppose integration in the form of legislation proposed by the European Commission. 
What causes this change of heart? The answer, this paper will argue, is to be found in the 
                                                 
3 See Commission of the European Communities (2002b). 
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initial fog (i.e. uncertainty) that surrounds EU integration proposals in terms of their costs 
and benefits for economic interests. But as the fog lifts and the terms of integration 
become more concrete, certain economic agents may realize that the proposed legislation 
that is on the table is not beneficial to their interests. Thus, they turn against it or lobby 
for amendments and exceptions, even if they initially supported integration in this 
particular policy area. If enough of these interests mobilize and lobby against the 
proposal, then it is likely to fail (directly or indirectly) at the EP and/or the Council. 
  This phenomenon may be more prevalent in reality than commonly presumed by 
scholars of European integration and lobbying, who usually assume that economic 
interests are fully cognisant of the net benefits or costs of integration in a given sector 
right from the start and, consequently, that they will readily share this information with 
uncertain policy-makers through lobbying activities. Although it is true that economic 
interests will share the information they possess in a given policy area, this does not mean 
that they know what the costs and benefits of integration are or will be. These depend on 
the form that integration will take, i.e. which rules, regulations and standards will be part 
of the new supranational legislation. As a result, economic interests may support greater 
integration in principle but not promote it actively. Consequently, the actual impetus for 
integration may come more from a policy entrepreneur like the European Commission 
(Nugent 1995). 
  This chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses the weaknesses of 
the main theoretical approaches to the study of economic interests and regional 
integration. The subsequent section presents the argument regarding the relationship 
between economic interests and European integration under the assumption that there is 
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initially a fair degree of uncertainty surrounding interests’ cost-benefit calculations. The 
following two sections examine in detail the cases of the Software Patent and Takeover 
Directives, which are both integration failures but with different characteristics. The first 
one is an example of direct integration failure (i.e. no supranational legislation) whereas 
the second case is representative of cases of indirect integration failure (i.e. the 
formalisation of the status quo).
4 Moreover, the Software Directive case is representative 
of situations where economic interests are organised on a transnational basis while the 
case of the Takeover Directive is an example of instances where interests are organised 
nationally. As such, these two cases allow us to assess the merit of the argument as well 
as draw certain hypotheses for future research on EU integration. The final section 
concludes on the need of existing theories of European integration to revise their 
understanding of the role played by economic interests in European integration. 
 
ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
The main theories of European integration give a prominent place to the role that 
economic interests play in the process. For neofunctionalists, economic interests are pro-
actively supportive of the successive integration of various sectors of the economy across 
borders (usually through the harmonisation of regulations and standards) as a way to 
overcome the increasing transaction costs that arise from the international exchange of 
goods, services, capital and people. For liberal intergovernmentalists, domestic economic 
interests determine the positions of the member states on a given policy issue, whose 
outcome is determined by states’ bargaining amongst themselves. 
                                                 
4 The integration concept of mutual recognition of standards generally falls into this category. The 
phenomenon of indirect integration failure has, curiously, received very little attention from EU scholars, 
even though many EU policy areas have experienced it. 
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In his study of regional economic integration, Mattli (1999) argues that the 
demand for integration comes from business interests that wish to reduce the transaction 
costs associated with cross-border trade. Transaction costs arise because of such obstacles 
as tariffs, quotas, different standards and regulations, different languages and cultures, 
etc. (see Mattli 1999: 47). Consequently, firms lobby for a new governance structure that 
fosters market integration (Mattli 1999: 49). This new ‘governance structure’ may 
include (over time) such things as ‘common trade rules, common industrial standards, tax 
harmonisation, macroeconomic policy coordination and common social policies’ (49). 
Even if Mattli’s ‘transaction-cost’ approach is based on new institutional 
economics (North 1990; Williamson 1985), it can easily be compared to 
neofunctionalism (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963). One of the key building blocks of 
neofunctionalism is the concept of functional spillover, whereby the integration of 
particular economic sectors across countries creates pressures for integration in related 
sectors (so as to reduce transaction costs and, thereby, increase economic exchanges 
across borders). These pressures originate from economic interests that are adapting and 
benefiting from policy areas that are already integrated. This process is complemented by 
another parallel one: political spillover. In the latter, socio-economic interests transfer 
their loyalties and activities to the supranational level because they realise that this is 
where they can best achieve their objectives. In turn, this political spillover leads to 
greater functional spillover. In this ratcheting-up process, regional integration becomes 
almost irreversible, not to say teleological.  
One important difference between Mattli’s approach to regional integration and 
neofunctionalism’s lies in the role given to supranational institutions. According to 
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neofunctionalism, such institutions (or higher authorities) are key drivers (sponsors and 
guides) of integration, as long as they have some degree of autonomy. According to 
Mattli, supranational institutions are much weaker drivers of integration; the regional 
leader (or hegemon) is key to the supply of integration. The implicit recognition here is 
that states are the suppliers of integration. As such, they also have the ability to 
slowdown or stop integration (see also Hoffmann 1966). Moravcsik (1993, 1998) argues 
that states’ position vis-à-vis integration is a function of the pressures they face from 
domestic societal (mainly economic) interests. The outcome of integration then depends 
on the intergovernmental bargaining that takes place between states, which is itself a 
question of state power. This is why Garrett (1992) argues that focusing solely on the 
functional aspects of international integration is insufficient. Instead, analysts need to 
take into account ‘the distributional conflicts between states and the impact of power 
asymmetries on conflict resolution’ (534). Drezner (2005) makes a similar point in his 
analysis of international policy convergence. For example, he indicates that coordination 
outcomes are dependent not only on the benefits of convergence but also on the 
adjustment costs that states would have to undertake if they were to switch to another 
country’s standards. 
 
While governments may receive benefits from the development of a single global 
standard, this does not mean that states will prefer any [italic in original] global standard. 
For governments, any agreement to coordinate standards at a point that diverges from the 
domestic status quo comes with economic and political costs (Drezner 2005: 845). 
 
So, contrary to neofunctionalism, Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist 
approach argues (1) that economic interests exercise their influence at the domestic level, 
not at the supranational one, and (2) that economic interests may not always be in favour 
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of integration. In any case, both approaches give economic interests a prominent role in 
the integration process. This role requires, however, that economic interests be clearly 
aware of the costs and benefits of integration, which may not always be the case. Just as 
war does for armies, regional economic integration gives rise to a fair amount of 
uncertainty for its participants.  
Following Clausewitz (1984[1832]), we could indeed argue that there exists a ‘fog 
of integration’. Governments as well as economic interests and supranational institutions 
are in fact most often unable to foresee all possible contingencies that can arise with 
respect to the integration of a given policy area. All sorts of unexpected ‘frictions’, to use 
Clausewitz’s term, can arise to produce a less than optimal outcome. This uncertainty is 
readily recognised with regards to governments and supranational institutions but not in 
the case of economic interests. As the bearers of knowledge and information, the latter 
are generally seen as crucial elements in explaining regional economic integration. 
However, if economic interests are uncertain about their payoffs regarding a certain 
integration policy outcome, they are unlikely to lobby actively in favour or against it, 
either at the national and/or supranational level. Only once there is a legislative proposal 
on the table will interest groups mobilize one way or the other. As a result, their role in 
giving integration’s initial impetus may be less prominent than proponents of 
neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism would have us believe. 
  The case of European Monetary Union (EMU) is illustrative. Although business 
interests and banks were generally in favour of a common currency, they did not lobby 
for it (Grossman 2002; Leblond 2004; McNamara 1998, 1999). They supported it but did 
not actively push for it. In fact, although they could anticipate benefits from EMU, they 
  7 
could not assess their level (Verdun 2000). The same applied to the costs of EMU. Only 
once concrete legislative proposals were on the table, could economic interests begin 
their calculations. Until then, the ambiguity caused them to act as mere ‘cheerleaders’ 
rather robustly active players. This is why there were keen to obtain the political and 
legislative details of EMU from the Commission and the Council (Leblond 2004). The 
uncertainty regarding the net benefits of monetary integration made it difficult to lobby 
for or against it (McNamara 1999). Support was positive but only with respect to the 
principle of a single currency. The fact that policy issues are often not well understood 
from the start makes it difficult for economic interests to devise specific strategies and 
lines of action (Grossman 2004). It is only when the fog (uncertainty) recedes that 
economic interests can decide on a specific course of action (e.g., lobby for or against a 
proposed legislation). 
  The absence of lobbying or pressures by economic interests does not mean that 
integration cannot take place. It just leaves a greater role for states and supranational 
institutions to play in the process, especially as initiators of integration. In the case of 
EMU, for example, France, Italy and Germany put EMU back on the European table 
(Gros and Thygesen 1992). However, the European Commission and a group of experts 
known as the Delors Committee also played a prominent role in moving European 
monetary integration forward towards the Maastricht Treaty (Jabko 1999; Verdun 1999). 
Then, the Commission and the European Monetary Institute ensured that EMU would 
indeed become a reality by completing the (incomplete) contract signed in Maastricht 
(Leblond 2004). 
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  How does the fog or uncertainty that surrounds economic interests at the 
beginning of the integration process affect our understanding of the process of regional 
economic integration, especially if we continue to assume that economic interests have an 
important role in the process? For one, it highlights the importance that states and 
supranational institutions have in the process. This does not mean, however, that 
economic interests are not important players in the process. Without their support for 
integration (in principle) at the beginning of the process (in a given policy area), then it is 
doubtful that member states and/or the Commission would initiate it in the first place. 
Once they are able to calculate the costs and benefits of integration, economic interests 
will indeed play a determinant role in the outcome of the integration process (as defined 
by the existence of a body of supranational laws and regulations), as many analysts of the 
EU’s policy-making process have now been arguing for over a decade (see inter alia 
Andersen and Eliassen 1991; Coen 1997; Greenwood et al. 1992; Mazey and Richardson 
1993). In fact, the relationship between European integration and economic interests may 
be more dynamic than traditional theories of integration tend to argue. Such an approach 
would help rescue neofunctionalism in its inability to explain the absence or limited 
degree of integration in certain policy areas (Hass 1976). Economic interests may be 
rhetorically behind functional and political spillovers in principle – owing to the 
uncertainty of the costs and benefits of integration – but may end up backtracking in 
practice when an integrative piece of supranational legislation is tabled by the 
Commission if the net benefits of integration are negative. 
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THE ARGUMENT: UNCERTAINTY, LOBBYING AND THE ROLES THAT 
ECONOMIC INTERESTS PLAY IN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
PROCESS 
 
So far, integration theories tell us that economic interests are often frustrated with the 
status quo of national rules, regulations and standards because they make international 
economic exchanges more costly than if borders did not exist. As a result, these interests 
are very supportive of any attempt to harmonize these rules, regulations and standards 
across-borders (i.e. integration). It does not necessarily mean, however, that they will be 
proactive in their support, in terms of lobbying governments or supranational institutions 
to integrate a given policy area. This is because these economic interests may not be clear 
about the costs and benefits of integration. It is possible that the harmonized rules or 
standards may require a lot of adaptation (i.e. be costly). The proposed rules may also 
give a competitor a clear competitive advantage. So spending a lot of money and energy 
on lobbying for integration may be very costly while providing little or no net benefits. 
Furthermore, integration as a principle or general concept can be considered a sort of 
public good for economic interests, whereby lobbying by one firm or group allows other 
firms and groups to do nothing and free ride. Consequently, no firm or group has any 
incentive to actively lobby in favour of integration. Claiming support for integration is 
sufficient. Public and private statements of support can be made, but little more. The 
burden of initiating the process of integration really lies with governments and/or 
supranational institutions. 
  Once the integration (harmonisation) process has been initiated and concrete 
proposals for legislation begin to emerge, then economic interests are in a better position 
to calculate the costs and benefits of harmonisation as the initial fog or uncertainty of 
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integration is being lifted by states and/or supranational institutions. In the case of the 
EU, the Commission is responsible for proposing legislation on a given policy issue, 
which has been accepted for integration by the member states. This does not mean, 
however, that the Commission drafts legislation in a vacuum. As many students of the EU 
have observed, the Commission does not hesitate to consult various organised interests to 
gather information and expertise at the drafting stage (Bouwen 2002; Coen 1997; 
Greenwood et al. 1992; Mazey and Richardson 1993). But here economic interests are 
not lobbying in favour of a certain position but are rather providing information and 
expertise requested by the Commission. As Bouwen (2002) and Coen (1997) note, the 
Commission needs expert knowledge as a result of insufficient resources and expertise 
but it also requires that the advice it receives not be in the self-interest of those providing 
it; otherwise, it is likely to limit the access it grants to those information providers. 
  The Commission will not be successful in pushing through a given legislation at 
the EP and the Council if it does not have the support of economic interests. The 
challenge for the Commission is to maintain the original support from a large majority of 
economic interests as the uncertainty regarding the costs and benefits of integration 
disappears. Drezner (2005) indicates that the expected additional profit (i.e. the benefit) 
arising from integration (or harmonisation) is a function of the relative size of the market 
to which the firm (or economic interests) will now have an easier access. For its part, the 
adjustment cost is a function of the ‘distance’ between the pre-existing regulatory 
standards in various member states. This distance could be purely technical but it could 
also be more fundamental, i.e. based on different underlying philosophies. For example, 
accounting standards in the EU vary considerably: those of France and Germany are 
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devised mainly for tax purposes while those in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
focus on the needs of investors. This reflects the different capitalist traditions in the 
various countries, with capital being traditionally provided by banks in France and 
Germany while it is mainly provided by securities markets in the Netherlands and the 
UK. One would expect that the adjustment cost would be higher when standards have 
different philosophies or underlying principles. A firm’s adjustment cost could also be a 
function of some factor intrinsic to its business, such as its capacity to effect change 
within its organization or products/services (e.g., a large firm with a bureaucratic culture). 
If there is a conflict between various economic interests – e.g., one firm accepts 
the legislative proposal while the other rejects it, then the EP and the Council have to 
decide the final outcome. They will do so based on the amount of lobbying performed by 
the respective firms (or, more generally, interest groups). The firm (or group) that lobbies 
the most widely and intensely should in principle win. This can mean the rejection of the 
Commission’s proposal or its amendment. There is also the possibility that the 
Commission withdraws its proposal beforehand in order to submit a new, maybe more 
diluted version.  
If the Commission is strategic, then it should choose an appropriate proposal right 
from the beginning, in order to maximize its chances of getting the EP and Council to 
vote for it. It is not always possible, however, for the Commission to harmonize standards 
in ways that reconcile pre-existing standards or regulations. For example, in the case of 
accounting standards it was impossible for the Commission to come up with a new set of 
European standards that would make the cost of adjustment the same for everyone. The 
different philosophies underlying existing standards across the EU were simply not 
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compatible. In such cases, the Commission has to choose one standard over another. This 
is likely to lead to intense lobbying on sides of the debate: i.e. for and against the 
proposed supranational standard. If one group has too few resources to lobby effectively, 
then we can expect the other group to prevail (i.e. see the EP and the Council adopt its 
preferred position). However, as the case studies demonstrate in the next sections, such a 
situation is more likely when economic interests are organized on a transnational basis 
rather than on a national one, where it is cheaper to lobby. In the latter case, member state 
governments will oppose the legislation in the Council. If enough of them are against it, a 
sufficient minority will block the proposed legislation.  
Although a blocking minority in the Council could mean the end of the proposal, 
it could also push the Commission to introduce a new proposal that more or less codifies 
the  status quo by recognising both standards as acceptable. This is what mutual 
recognition is all about. In most cases, though, it can be considered to be a case of non-
integration because it does not remove the existing transaction costs in place as a result of 
the various rules, regulations and standards. Such a situation, however, may be preferable 
to the Commission than outright legislative failure since it still affirms its jurisdiction in 
the given policy area and, as a result, allows it to build expertise, legitimacy and support 
for a renewed attempt at integration in the future.  
This is the scenario that applies to the case of the harmonisation of accounting 
standards in the EU. From the late 1970s to the early 2000s, the were two accounting 
directives that harmonized only the rules for presenting financial accounts but not their 
measurement, which is the key issue in terms of being able to compare the accounts of 
companies located in different countries. This changed in January 2005 when the 
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International Accounting Standards Board’s reporting standards became the new 
harmonized rules for all firms quoted on an EU stock exchange. This integration of 
accounting standards in the EU became possible only as a result of changes in the 
international political economy (Leblond 2006). As we will see below, the same thing 
happened in the case of the Takeover Directive. 
In sum, it is possible for economic interest to support integration right from the 
beginning even though they do not know on what basis harmonisation would take place 
and there is a risk that the adopted standard strays too far from the standard under which 
they are currently operating, whereby they would face a net cost from integration. Firms 
can afford to take this risk because they know that they always have the possibility to 
lobby the EP and the Council down the road against a non-advantageous legislation being 
proposed by the Commission. For the Commission, it is important to consult firms (i.e. 
economic interests) early in the process in order to assess their support for integration in a 
given policy area and obtain information regarding their potential payoffs from standards 
harmonisation so that it may choose the most appropriate legislation to foster integration. 
If support is not forthcoming, then the Commission need not go any further with its 
intention to integrate a certain policy domain.  
Even if economic interests are supportive of European integration, it does not 
necessarily mean that they will lobby in its favour. Some might not lobby at all. Others 
might lobby against integration. The present section has argued that there are situations 
where integration may fail as a result of lobbying by economic interests. This may seem 
paradoxical on the part of economic interests but as the fog of integration lifts, the 
calculus of economic interests changes. The ability to determine more precisely the 
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benefits and costs of harmonising standards, rules or regulations will lead economic 
interests to decide whether to lobby (for or against) or not with respect to a proposed 
legislation by the Commission. The structure of this lobbying will likely determine the 
integration outcome. The next sections examine two cases of failed European integration 
to assess the validity of the argument presented so far. 
  
TO PATENT OR NOT TO PATENT: THE CASE OF THE COMPUTER-
IMPLEMENTED INVENTIONS DIRECTIVE 
 
The case of the Computer Implemented Inventions Directive – better known as the so-
called ‘Software Patent Directive’ – is indicative of the apparently paradoxical 
relationship between economic interests and European integration since it was rejected by 
the EP in early July 2006, following intense lobbying by developers and users of open-
source software and small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). According to the 
Commission, however, there was clearly an initial demand for harmonising standards in 
this area. The objective was to remove the existing legal ambiguity regarding software 
patents. The problem was that ‘a computer-implemented invention may be protected in 
one Member State but not in another, which has direct and negative effect on the proper 
functioning of the internal market’ (Commission of the European Communities 2002a: 2-
3). It is only once the Commission’s proposal was published that the uncertainty or fog of 
integration lifted, which allowed the various private economic interests to define their 
positions. 
  The Commission justified the need for harmonising national laws with respect to 
software patents on the grounds that the varying interpretations of patentability laws by 
national courts created nefarious legal uncertainty that limited innovation on Europe 
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(Commission of the European Communities 2002a). This was despite the fact there 
existed a supranational European Patent Office to grant European patents and a European 
Patent Convention to harmonise national laws regarding patentability. Divergence in 
court interpretations had for effect to render uncertain the scope of patent protection 
accorded to certain categories of software invention. The Commission argued that this 
situation had ‘real and negative effect on investment decisions and free movement of 
goods within the internal market’ (Commission of the European Communities 2002a: 9). 
This is because software companies would develop and sell their products only in 
jurisdictions where they found high patent protection from local courts. 
  At the time, the jurisprudence related to ‘computer-implemented inventions’ had 
been developed by courts in Germany and the United Kingdom only. In the UK, software 
(i.e. a computer programme) that corresponds to a method of doing business (e.g., e-
commerce) or performing a mental act (e.g., some mathematical calculation) was 
considered unpatentable even if there was a ‘technical contribution’ (a term subject to 
interpretation and key to the Commission’s proposed directive).
5 Instead, such 
programmes are protected by existing copyright laws, where the written code and 
instructions’ manual cannot be copied without authorisation from the copyright holder. In 
Germany, however, the jurisprudence did not exclude the possibility that business 
methods could be patentable. This means that the scope of patent protection in Germany 
was much larger than in the UK. The result was that a piece of software could be 
protected in Germany but not in the UK. Clearly, this contravened the EU’s principle of 
the free movement of goods. 
                                                 
5 The patent exists to protect the fundamental technical background of the software or computer 
programme. Thus, the automation of a technique, task or method already known does not represent 
technical contribution worth patenting according to UK jurisprudence. 
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  In October 2000, the Commission launched a wide (and final) consultation of the 
public on the issue. Two camps emerged (Commission of the European Communities 
2002a: 4). On the one hand, there were developers and users of open-source software as 
well as SMEs, which argued against making software patentable. On the other hand, there 
were large software manufacturers, like Microsoft, and regional and sectoral 
organizations such as the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations (UNICE), 
the European Information and Communications Technology Industry Association,
6 and 
the European IT Service Association. Intellectual property professionals, such as lawyers, 
were also supportive of patents for software. Another important group that supported the 
idea of a software patent directive was the Business Software Alliance (BSA). It 
represents members such as Adobe, Apple, Autodesk, Compaq, Dell, IBM, Intel, 
Microsoft and Symantec. 
  In February 2002, the Commission issued its proposed directive on the 
patentability of computer-implemented inventions (Commission of the European 
Communities 2002a).
7 The core element of the Software Patent Directive was the notion 
of ‘technical contribution’, which is defined as ‘a contribution to the state of the art in a 
technical field which is not obvious to a person skilled in the art’ (13). This was the key 
concept in determining whether new software was patentable or not. The Commission 
saw it as a limit on the scope of patentability. Otherwise, the EU would have joined the 
United States, where the level of patent protection is very high since there is no 
                                                 
6 The EICTA merged with the European Association of Consumer Electronics Manufacturers (EACEM) in 
2001 to form the European Information, Communications and Consumer Electronics Technology Industry 
Associations (EICEA). It combines 32 national digital technology associations from 24 European countries. 
It represents more than 10,000 enterprises with more than two million employees. 
7 The Directive defines computer-implemented invention as ‘any invention implemented on a computer or 
similar apparatus which is realised by a computer program’ (Commission of the European Communities 
2002a: 13). 
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requirement for a computer programme to provide a technical contribution in order to be 
patented. This means that patenting business methods is acceptable in the US. The fear 
with such an approach is that it stifles competition, innovation in information technology 
and, most especially, the development of new business methods like e-commerce. ‘By 
codifying the requirement for a technical contribution, the Directive should ensure that 
patents for “pure” business methods or more generally social processes will not be 
granted because they do not meet the strict criteria, including the need for technical 
contribution’ (Commission of the European Communities 2002a: 11). 
  In September 2003, the EP, under the co-decision procedure, proposed an 
amended Software Patent Directive that further limited patentability. This followed 
strong lobbying by groups such as the Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure 
(FFII) – which created Nosoftwarepatents.com to promote freeware and open source 
software widely, the Free Software Foundation, the European Association of Craft, Small 
and Medium-sized Enterprises (UEAPME) as well as companies such as Red Hat, Novell 
and MySQL. These groups wished to seriously curtail the Commission’s proposal 
regarding the patentability of software because they feared that it would prevent open- 
source software such as Linux – the alternative operating system to Windows – to emerge 
and compete against the products of larger software manufacturers, thereby stifling 
innovation and competition. 
In the spring of 2004, the Council of Ministers made a counter proposal to that 
offered by the EP. The ‘compromised’ document basically removed all the EP’s 
amendments. After a year of wrangling between the member states, the Council finally 
adopted its ‘common position’ (i.e. the second reading that ratified the spring 2004 
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decision).
8 In early July 2005, the EP rejected the amended directive proposed by the 
Council (and the Commission). As a result, the Software Patent Directive failed to 
become law and the status quo with all its associated legal uncertainties and ambiguities 
remained. 
In terms of the argument presented in the previous section, the Software Patent 
Directive case is akin to the situation where only two opposite standards are available: 
patents vs. no patents. Both groups initially supported the idea of harmonising EU 
standards in this area; however, they differed as to how much harmonisation should take 
place. Large software firms and intellectual property professionals supported patents and 
the Europe-wide harmonisation of the rules applicable to them with respect to software. 
Small software developers and many individual users were in favour of harmonisation 
across the EU but saw an opportunity to limit the patentability of software programmes.  
In the first case, large firms use patents defensively as bargaining chips when they 
collaborate in order to make their software programmes compatible with each other. 
Otherwise, they have to pay licensing fees to other manufacturers. So they argue that an 
absence of patent protection would reduce the incentive for innovation and new products. 
In the second case, SMEs claim that patents, which are costly to obtain, prevent them 
from competing against larger software manufacturers. Consequently, they are not in a 
position to negotiate with larger manufacturers. They lack bargaining chips. This is why 
they are fervent supporters of open-source software, which is made fully available to the 
public for interoperability at no cost. In such a world, there is no market protection. Any 
software developer is able to successfully enter the market simply by devising a 
programme that is compatible with other existing programmes and, therefore, that can be 
                                                 
8 Poland, with some support from Hungary, Latvia and the Netherlands, opposed the directive. 
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marketed on its own merits. As such, copyright protection of the programme itself is 
sufficient. 
The Commission proposed a directive favouring patents, which was accepted by 
large software manufacturers but rejected by small software developers and individual 
users. Because their competitive advantage was at stake one way or another, both groups 
lobbied forcefully for its position. Although financially less resourceful than the 
multinational firms, small software developers and users nevertheless managed to mount 
an effective lobbying campaign with the EP, framing the debate in terms of David against 
Goliath. Initially, the larger, multinational firms most probably thought that they could 
muster greater lobbying resources than the smaller firms, which is why they did not 
hesitate to lobby in favour of the Commission’s proposal, especially with the member 
states to influence the Council’s decision. As Bouwen (2002, 2004) argues, however, the 
EP has a greater demand for information about European encompassing interest than 
expert knowledge (which the Commission demands) or even domestic encompassing 
interest (which is more relevant to the Council).
9 As such, although the alliance of large 
software manufacturers was probably better at providing the Commission with expert 
knowledge and the Council with national encompassing interest (especially in countries 
where such firms have important operations), it found it much more difficult to provide 
the EP with high-quality information about European encompassing interest than small 
firms and the European association of consumers (BEUC) could. 
  In sum, the Software Patent Directive case is a good illustration of a situation 
where integration was clearly considered to be a good thing given the various national 
                                                 
9 Coen (1997: 103-4) indicates that large firms have been slower in transferring resources to lobbying the 
EP than the transfer of power to the EP as a result of the Maastricht Treaty would suggest.  
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patent regulations in place across the EU, which represented an obstacle to the free 
movement of software programmes and the goods that use them. Not only did this limit 
competition, it also reduced innovation. Therefore, the Commission felt fully justified in 
proposing a directive that would harmonise the patentability of computer-implemented 
innovation across the entire EU. The reason why this attempt at integration failed is that 
private economic interests had different views as to what should be patentable or not. 
Large firms wanted more protection (i.e. wider applicability of patents) in order to 
maintain their existing competitive advantage, whereby patents were used as bargaining 
chips in making software programmes compatible across firms. For large multinational 
software manufacturers, it was important to also limit the gap between European patent 
rules for software and those of the United States, which had a permissible system of 
patenting software programmes. For their part, smaller firms and end users preferred a 
much more open system where the level of patent protection was very low. This would 
make it easier for them to compete with the large software manufacturers, especially in 
the key European market. In the end, the proponents of less protection won the day by 
gaining the EP’s support, which caused the proposed directive to fail (i.e. be abandoned) 
and the status quo (i.e. national patent regulations) to remain. 
 
EVERYTHING GOES: THE CASE OF THE TAKEOVER DIRECTIVE 
At the end of 2003, the Council and the EP approved a Takeover Directive for the EU. 
This came after almost 15 years of wrangling on the issue, although all parties understood 
the need for harmonising company takeover rules across the Union.
10 Such harmonisation 
                                                 
10 In fact, the issue dates back to the early 1970s. For a history of the Takeover Directive, see Callaghan 
and Höpner (2005). 
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was seen as crucial for facilitating the cross-border mergers and acquisitions, which in 
turn would facilitate the complete integration of EU economies. Many (including the 
Commission) complained, however, that the agreed (compromised) legislation did not 
improve economic integration in the EU but, instead, would increase protectionism. This 
is because the directive allows member states to opt out of key provisions limiting 
defensive measures that EU companies can adopt to fend off unwanted buyers: (1) 
multiple voting shares and (2) poison pill defences without shareholder approval.
11 The 
Commission had wanted to forbid such practices against takeovers unless they were 
approved by shareholders but it was forced by the EP and the Council to water down its 
proposal (Commission of the European Communities 2002b). As a result of these opt-
outs, the Takeover Directive is now generally considered a failure because member states 
have taken full advantage of these opt-outs (Financial Times, 2 March 2006). 
An earlier legislative proposal was rejected by the EP in July 2001,
12 following 
Germany’s strong opposition as a result of intense lobbying by firms such as 
Volkswagen, Porsche and BASF, which felt vulnerable to foreign predators without 
protection from takeovers (Financial Times, 24 November 2003). Many family-
controlled German firms argued against the Commission’s earlier proposal because it 
called for management to remain neutral in case of a takeover and, therefore, not 
undertake any defence against a acquisition attempt. For example, the German state of 
Lower Saxony owns approximately 20 per cent of Volkswagen (VW), which allows it to 
                                                 
11 Multiple voting shares (shares that provide more than one vote) allow a minority of shareholders to block 
takeovers even if a majority of stockholders (with shares worth only one vote) is in favour of selling its 
shares to a (hostile) acquirer. Poison pill defences work to dilute the shareholdings of stockholders who 
might be interested in selling their shares to the acquirer. Obviously, if such defensive measures required 
the approval of a majority of existing shareholders, then it is likely that it would vote against such value-
destroying measures. 
12 The EP was split on the issue: 273 votes for and 273 votes against. 
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pressure the automaker to save local jobs rather than cut costs to maximise profits. As a 
result, it would want VW to fight any attempt by a foreign firm to take it over and force it 
to manage with the goal of maximising profits. VW was able to use its close links with 
the social democrats, which happened to be in power at the time, to influence the German 
government’s position on the issue in its favour.
13 Many members of the EP (MEPs) 
agreed with the German position because they felt that the absence of a level playing 
field with the United States, which allows takeover defences such as poison pills, would 
open the door wide open to US firms acquiring European ones while the reverse would 
be more difficult. Furthermore, many MEPs thought that the proposed directive did not 
sufficiently protect the employees of the targeted companies. 
Given the fact that a directive on takeover bids was a key component of the 
Financial Services Action Plan that would integrate Europe’s financial markets by 2010, 
the Commission submitted a new version of the Takeover Directive to the EP and the 
Council for approval at the end of 2002 (Commission of the European Communities 
2002b). This move was welcomed by UNICE, the European employers’ federation, 
which strongly favoured a common framework for cross-border takeover bids. The 
problem was that Germany and German MEPs opposed the Commission’s new draft 
directive because it did not prohibit shares with multiple voting rights (Callaghan and 
Höpner 2005: 310-311). The draft directive proposed the so-called ‘breakthrough rule’ 
(article 11) to prevent the use of poison pills by suspending restrictions on voting rights 
as well as transfers of securities during the period for acceptance of the bid but did not, 
however, limit the existence of shares with multiple voting rights.
14 The German position 
                                                 
13 Chancellor Schröder was premier of Lower Saxony before becoming Germany’s head of government. 
14 Multiple voting rights are illegal in Germany. 
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was clear: either the Takeover Directive rules out all takeover defence mechanisms or it 
rules out none. 
Given the fact that German opposition to the earlier proposed legislation had been 
successful, it was impossible for the Commission to ignore the German government’s 
request for including multiple voting rights in article 11. Amending the draft directive in 
such a way, however, faced strong opposition from France and the Nordic countries 
(Denmark, Finland and Sweden), which had supported the previous version of the 
directive (Callaghan and Höpner 2005: 311). The reason is that these countries allow the 
issuance of shares with multiple voting rights. For example, the Wallenberg family in 
Sweden has been able to keep a significant degree of control over many Swedish 
industrial multinational firms (e.g., ABB, AstraZeneca, Ericsson, Electrolux, Saab, SKF) 
via its holdings of shares with multiple voting rights, even if it effectively owned a small 
percentage of these firms’ capital stock. In Sweden, three-quarters of the top firms are 
said to be deviating from the principle of ‘one share, one vote’ (Financial Times, 18 
October 2005).
15 Faced with this imbroglio, the Commission tried to find a way to isolate 
the Nordic countries while keeping France’s support for the draft directive by proposing 
that different classes of shares with multiple voting rights be prohibited but not France’s 
double voting rights, which are allowed for certain shareholders if they meet certain 
conditions.
16 This strategy backfired when Germany maintained its position that all 
multiple voting rights be outlawed if other forms of takeover defences were to be 
restricted (Callaghan and Höpner 2005: 311). 
                                                 
15 A study conducted for the Association of British Insurers in March 2005 found that one third of the 
companies included in the FTSE Eurofirst 300 index (i.e. Europe’s 300 largest firms) deviated from the one 
share-one vote principle, with about one fifth having classes of shares with multiple voting rights 
(Financial Times, 18 October 2005). 
16 Double voting rights are often accompanied by caps on voting rights. 
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After many months of wrangling, the Takeover Directive was adopted by the 
Council and the EP in a highly watered-down compromise that allowed member states to 
opt out of the neutrality (of management) rule (article 9) and the breakthrough rule 
(article 11). Everybody thought a deal was better than no deal at all given the amount of 
time that had passed since the Commission’s first proposal in the late 1980s (Financial 
Times, 24 November 2003).
17 But the end result is pretty much the same as if the EU had 
not adopted the Takeover Directive given the number of member states that have taken 
advantage of the opt-outs (Sagayam 2006). 
  The case of the Takeover Directive is a good example of how the fog of 
integration causes private economic interests to be initially supportive of harmonising 
national regulations and standards in order to improve cross-border commercial 
exchanges. However, once the Commission tables a proposition, then interests tend to 
polarize. Contrary to the Software Patent Directive, where the division was between large 
firms and smaller ones (along with consumers) on a transnational basis, the Takeover 
Directive saw business interests divide themselves on the basis of nationality. As a result, 
lobbying was most intense at the national level. Even MEPs tended to vote on the basis of 
nationality rather than party affiliation (Callaghan and Höpner 2005). In the end, the 
Commission was faced with the choice of seeing its proposition – which aimed at truly 
harmonising the regulation of takeovers in the EU by restricting the use of defence 
mechanisms – defeated by the EP and the Council in favour of a compromised solution 
that more or less recognised the status quo or withdrawing it in favour of the status quo. 
                                                 
17 The only exception is Frits Bolkestein, the then Internal Market Commissioner, who threatened to either 
veto the agreement reached by the Council and the EP – such a move would have required a unanimous 
vote in the Council to pass the directive – or retract the Commission’s proposal altogether. In any case, his 
colleagues in the Commission did not support him (Callaghan and Höpner 2005: 311). 
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After so many years, it was considered that the cost of starting from scratch again would 
be too costly. It was better to try to build on the existing directive, which had to be 
revised after five years. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Scholars of European integration in particular and regional economic integration in 
general have argued that private economic interests have an important role in the 
integration process. Usually, this role is a positive one. The argument is that such 
interests desire more cross-border economic exchanges but face important transaction 
costs as a result of differentiated national laws, regulations and standards; consequently, 
they ask their respective governments to get together and harmonise these rules for 
conducting business (i.e. integrate various policy areas). Depending on the theoretical 
approach, this integration process can take either a transnational/supranational form or a 
national/intergovernmental one. 
  In fact, private economic interests’ initial support for integration does not always 
result in integration actually taking place, as the cases of the Software Patent and 
Takeover Directives presented herein demonstrate. On any process to integrate a given 
policy area, there may be interests that are bound to lose out in terms of facing greater 
costs to adjust to the new harmonised rules or standards. Consequently, they are likely to 
lobby for amending the proposed rules, if not abandoning them altogether. This lobbying 
is likely to take place at the EP and the Council since the fog of integration lifts only once 
the Commission has tabled a draft piece of legislation. Only then can interests groups 
assess where they stand with respect to integration and how they will respond to 
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integration efforts. Hence, the ultimate outcome depends on the adjustment and lobbying 
costs of both sides relative to the benefits that they are likely to obtain from integration. 
  This means that the role of private economic interests in the integration process is 
not as straightforward as traditionally understood by scholars of regional economic and 
European integration. Private economic interests can, under certain circumstances, slow 
down or prevent integration from progressing forward. This is something that students of 
European politics and public policy have long understood and was made clear by Hix 
(1994) more than ten years ago. The time has now come to try to combine these different 
approaches and foci into a more coherent theoretical framework for understanding 
regional integration in general and European integration in particular. Maybe theories of 
public policy making in the EU can finally provide the missing link between 
neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. 
The two cases examined in this chapter show the way for fruitful research agenda 
for the future. For instance, they help us derive two hypotheses: (1) we are likely to see 
no integration take place at all (i.e. no supranational legislation) when private economic 
interests polarize transnationally on a given policy issue; (2) we are likely to see only the 
formalisation of the status quo in form of supranational legislation that allows opt-outs or 
the mutual recognition of existing national rules and standards when interests polarise on 
a national basis. Another example lies with the Takeover Directive, which does not really 
push integration forward even if it was adopted. This suggests that in many policy areas 
where there exists European legislation the degree of integration may be more formal 
than substantial. Therefore, analysing and explaining the varying depth of European 
integration across policy areas should also be an important part of this new research 
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agenda on regional integration. After all, maybe the EU is not as integrated as we think. 
In the same vein, maybe North America is more integrated than we think. If so, we need 
to know why and existing theories of regional economic integration are currently unable 
to offer us the answer. 
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